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I. INTRODUCTION 
As technology has rapidly evolved over the past century there has been a great schism 
created between technical advances and the refinement of the laws in order to protect the rights 
of citizens. This friction frequently takes years to remedy and often results in scattered case law 
and a patchwork of statutory provisions that make compliance with the law daunting for aspiring 
innovators. The time has come for the legal community to address issues related to privacy in the 
context of mobile devices. 
While it is easy to take the idea of privacy for granted, the justification behind the “right 
to be let alone” has developed generation-by-generation and evolved gradually throughout the 
history of our nation. What began as a revolutionary era desire to be free from illegal 
governmental searches and seizures evolved into a moral right cherished by intellectuals. By the 
end of the 19th century, legal scholars recognized a legal “right to privacy” and classified certain 
invasions as tortuous acts punishable with damages. With the dawn of electronic 
communications the common law right to privacy became a constitutionally mandated 
“expectation” in the context of governmental searches. The 21st century has brought the prospect 
of universal communication via mobile devices and the current law has reached a cresting point 
as it relates to new technologies. 
This paper seeks to briefly document the development of privacy law and it’s relationship 
to technological developments in an effort to project where the law should go given the looming 
era of ubiquitous wireless mobile computing. In order to narrow the scope of discussion, the 
focal point will be the evolution of the Katz “expectation of privacy” in governmental searches 
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  The resulting analysis will be presented in light of 
changing technologies, ideologies and expectations. 
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II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
It was two young Harvard Law School graduates who warned, “numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”1 While this dire prediction seems to fit squarely into the 
discussion of mobile devices, it was actually a reference to George Eastman’s development and 
popularization of the film roll and “Kodak Camera™” in 1885.2  The rise of “yellow journalism” 
created a cause for alarm within legal circles that the scope of generally accepted legal rights 
should be broadened to include the “the right to be let alone.”3  
A. From a Moral Right to a Legal Right: “The Right to Privacy” 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 law review article gave birth to the notion of 
“privacy”-- a concept that there is an injury caused by the invasion of privacy that can be 
remedied by law. They wrote, “the existing law affords a principle from which may be invoked 
to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the 
photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for rewording or reproducing scenes 
or sounds.” Borrowing from the French right of privacy,4 the authors outlined six limits on the 
right to privacy.5 More importantly they suggested legal remedies for the invasion of the right of 
privacy in the form of either “an action of tort for damages” or the limited possibility of  “an 
                                                 
1 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
2 http://www.kodak.com/global/en/corp/historyOfKodak/eastmanTheMan.jhtml. 
3 Thomas C. Cooley, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). 
4 LOI RELATIVE À LA PRESSE (May 11, 1868). 
5 Warren and Brandeis’s limits on the right to privacy: 1) “does not prohibit any publication of 
matter which is of public or general interest,” 2) “does not prohibit the communication of any 
matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is made under circumstances which 
would render it a privileged communication according to the law of slander and libel,” 3) 
probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of 
special damage,” 4) “The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the 
individual, or with his consent,” 5) “the truth of the matter published does not afford a defence 
[sic],” and 6) “the absence of "malice" in the publisher does not afford a defence [sic].” 
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injunction.” Within a decade courts had begun to acknowledge the invasion of privacy as a tort 
cause of action6 and in 1903 New York became the first state to enact a privacy statute.7 By 
1960, courts had tried over 300 privacy court cases that William Prosser broke down into four 
distinct “invasion of privacy torts”: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private 
facts, (3) false light, and (4) appropriation.8 
B. From a Legal Right to a Constitutional Right: Brandeis Dissents in Olmstead 
Almost exactly a century before Warren and Brandeis penned their article, a group of 
men gathered on Wall Street to discuss potential limitations on the powers of the Federal 
government. Drawing from Lockean principles of protecting citizen’s economic rights against 
government,9 the debate focused upon protection against invasion of “the sanctities of a man’s 
home and the privacies of life.”10 Improving upon the prohibition against baseless search and 
seizure found in Virginia’s Declaration of Rights,11 they resolved that it is the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”12 These men were the first Congress of the United States and their proposal was 
the Bill of Rights. 
By 1928, Brandeis had become an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court 
and again a small group of men were debating citizen’s rights to privacy from governmental 
searches, only this time it was in light of the latest technological innovation-- the telephone. In a 
5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice William Taft -- the former President -- the Supreme Court 
                                                 
6 Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
7 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS ACT § 51 (1903). 
8 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
9 Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era, 218-250 
(1995). 
10 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
11 V.A. DECL. OF RIGHTS, ART. 10 (1776). 
12 U.S. CONST. AMEND IV. 
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held that telephone wires extending outside of one’s home “are not within the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment”13 and thus telephone conversations were subject to interception by the 
government. In one of the most famous dissents in Supreme Court history,14 Justice Brandeis 
made a compelling argument against the “evil incident to invasion of privacy.”15  
Brandeis’s opinion is prophetic in warning against the invasion of individual security 
afforded by new technologies: “the progress of science in furnishing the government with means 
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping.” He argued that in light of the fact that 
“subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
government,” the Supreme Court should extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment to 
telephone conversations as well as “every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual.” His reasoning was based upon the idea that drafters of the 
Constitution sought to promote the pursuit of happiness, therefore “they conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone-- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.” 
 While the holding in Olmstead was settled law for nearly 40 years, Brandeis’s concerns 
about the development of technology proved true as the sophistication of electronic surveillance 
increased in the 1960’s. In 1963, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the use of an informant 
using a hidden recording device, but the dissent relied heavily upon Brandeis’s theory of 
privacy.16 Justice Brennan warned against the narrow application of the Fourth Amendment, 
fearing that it could have a chilling effect on speech: “there is only one way to guard against such 
                                                 
13 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
14 http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm. 
15 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).   
16 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
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a risk, and that is to keep one’s mouth shut on all occasions.” He further concluded that “the right 
of privacy would mean little if it were limited to a person’s solitary thoughts.”  
C. From a Constitutional Right to an Expectation: Katz’s “Expectation of Privacy” 
In 1967, the Supreme Court had come full circle and was now willing to extend Fourth 
Amendment protection to warrantless wiretaps of telephone conversations held in public 
telephone booths.17 Justice Stewart’s majority opinion states that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places . . . but what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”18 The Katz test, articulated in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence, was a “twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Subsequent Supreme Court majority decisions embraced 
this test19 and Congress showed their support with the enactment of the Federal Wiretap Act in 
1968.20 
In abandoning the Olmstead decision, the Supreme Court not only expanded the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection but also created a sliding scale framework for privacy based upon 
the expectations of both the citizen and society. Katz created a useful method for courts to 
gradually adjust Fourth Amendment protections as technology evolved and changed expectations 
as to the right of privacy. In theory, it has become that Fourth Amendment protection only 
applies where society expects privacy. In practice, mobile devices have rapidly narrowed not 
only the places people consider private but also the information.   
                                                 
17 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
18 Id. at 351.  
19 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
20 THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, Title III, 18 U.S.C §§ 2510-
20 (1968). 
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D. Then and now: Technology from 1967 to 2010 
Just two years before Katz, a computer science professor named Gordon Moore stated 
“the complexity for minimum component costs has increased at a rate of roughly a factor of two 
per year.”21 As his projection proved true, the scientific community began to describe the 
constant progress of computing power as “Moore’s Law.” The first electronic computer, created 
in 1945, filled an entire room and had a clock speed of 100,000 pulses per second (0.1 mHz).22 In 
1971, Intel introduced it’s first microprocessor, the 4004™, which had a clock speed of 740 kHz 
(.74 mHz) and was roughly the size of a fingernail.23 Just last year, Apple introduced the iPhone 
3GS™, a smart phone with a processor clock speed of 600 mHz.24 Just as Moore had predicted, 
these advancements mean that an iPhone user has a pocket-sized device that is 800 times more 
powerful than the fastest processor being developed at the time Katz was decided.  
Almost more important than the advancement of silicon wafer microchips is the rapid 
development of wireless technologies in the first decade of the 21st century. Much of the analysis 
in Olmstead and later Katz focused on the fact that telephone wires can originate in one’s home 
yet travel through public forums at the other end of the conversation. Wireless cell phones have 
become a staple of modern society, with over 89% of Americans identifying themselves as cell 
phone users.25 Since communication on a mobile device by definition can originate anywhere the 
user get’s reception, there is no longer an expectation that personal telephone conversations 
would be conducted within one’s home. 
                                                 
21  Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS 
MAGAZINE (Apr. 19, 1965). 
22 http://isc.temple.edu/sdrury/survey/detail/ENIAC.html. 
23 http://www.intel.com/museum/archives/4004facts.htm. 
24http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/09/06/10/a_closer_look_at_iphone_3g_s_cortex_a8_arm
_and_powervr_chips.html. 
25 http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_Midyear_2009_Graphics.pdf. 
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In December 2000, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates wrote an essay proclaiming the arrival of 
the “Internet Age.”26 Gates predicted “by enabling instantaneous and seamless communication 
and commerce around the globe, from almost any device imaginable, this technology will be one 
of the key cultural and economic forces of the early 21st century.”27 Gate’s prediction has already 
proven true as today over 79% of adults in America are internet users and 55% connect to the 
internet wirelessly.28 The ability to send and receive data electronically using a mobile device 
has meant that users not only have access to their own personal data (such as mobile online 
banking) but also are more likely to upload new personal information to the internet from their 
cell phones (such as posting a photo or status update on Facebook).  
Katz made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not protect spaces, but rather people.29 
In the “internet age” people are defined not by sensory observations but rather their personal 
data. Today, the average American would have little problem with their picture being taken by a 
photojournalist (as was the complaint of Warren and Brandeis) but would most likely object to 
the electronic transmission of their medical history to a third party without their consent. 
Congress has created laws that reflect these modern societal norms in establishing 
photographer’s rights30 and enacting the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act 
(HIPAA).31  
                                                 
26 http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/billg/writing/shapingtheinternet.mspx. 
27 Id. (emphasis added). 
28 http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Internet-broadband-and-cell-phone-statistics.aspx. 
29 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
30 http://www.krages.com/ThePhotographersRight.pdf. 
31 See THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (“HIPAA”), codified at 
42 USC § 201 et seq. 
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E. The State of the Art: App Phones 
The current state of the art for mobile devices is what The New York Times columnist 
David Pogue has termed “app phones.”32 A generation beyond the “smart phone” (“a cellphone 
with e-mail”) “this new category — somewhere between cellphones and laptops, or even beyond 
them — deserves a name of its own.” The app phone feature list -- pioneered by the introduction 
of the iPhone -- typically includes: multiple wireless technologies (wifi, 3G, Bluetooth), a full 
web-browser, a video camera, proximity sensors (“light, tilt, location, proximity”) and even a 
Global Positioning System (“GPS”-- a location technology that uses satellite data). In addition to 
advanced hardware, app phones feature operating systems that allow users to store vast amounts 
of personal information in the form of calendars, contacts, photo albums, financial calculators 
and even medical information.  
Apple has sold over 50 million iPhones33 and has a library of over 185,000 downloadable 
iPhone “apps,”34 which are essentially small single-purpose applications. These apps are capable 
of using the iPhone’s hardware to input data, collect personal information and transmit it to 
potentially anyone connected to the internet. Mobile users commonly use apps to trade stocks, 
make purchases, locate restaurants and can even be used to read an MRI.35 Dumping cell phone 
data used to be simply getting numbers, but with the iPhone, now it’s everything about your life 
and often every bit of data you own. 
The fact is that cell phones cannot only be used in the facilitation of a crime (calling the 
getaway driver) but can actually be the crime scene itself. The government has an active interest 
                                                 
32 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/technology/personaltech/05pogue.html. 
33 http://events.apple.com.edgesuite.net/1004fk8d5gt/event. 
34 http://www.macrumors.com/2010/04/08/apples-iphone-os-4-0-media-event-sneak-peek-into-
the-future. 
35 http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/osirix/id296246375 
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in monitoring app phone activity if the device is being used for illegal gambling, fraudulent 
financial transactions or child pornography. However, access to this data may not be 
constitutional, as many would consider this data to be private and protected under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The apps often store their data not only locally on the mobile device, but also transmit 
certain data to remote servers wirelessly in order to provide increased functionality. With many 
users unaware of how their personal data is stored or transmitted using an app phone, it becomes 
difficult to gauge what their “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” might be under the first 
prong of the Katz test. If a mobile wireless user were to be subject to a governmental search of 
their app phone data, it is unclear to what extent “society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable’” under the second prong of Katz. A thorough review of case law will help reveal 
how courts have dealt with past technological developments and this should provide some 
answers as to the direction the law should take in the future. 
III. REVIEW OF CASE LAW 
In the four decades since Katz was decided, technology has evolved at a faster pace than 
any other time in human history.36 In the context of criminal investigations, courts have been 
reactive in addressing new technological developments, creating a remedial patchwork of case 
law with each new innovation. For purposes of analysis, the major cases will be broken down 
chronologically by innovation: (a) the telephone, (b) electronic surveillance, (c) the personal 
computer, (d) the internet and (e) the mobile phone. Note that even with these major evolutions 
in technology, the basic “expectation of privacy” test outlined in Katz remains the Constitutional 
guidepost for determining Fourth Amendment rights. 
                                                 
36 See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns (Mar. 7, 2001) (available 
KurzweilAI.net). 
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A. The Telephone: The Katz Progeny 
Decided in the final years of the Warren Court, the Katz ruling gave rise to the public 
perception that telephone conversations were constitutionally protected under the Fourth 
Amendment. Chief Justice Warren himself was such a firm believer in personal privacy that as a 
District Attorney in California he is said to have refused to wire tap the cell of a prisoner 
suspected of murdering his father, Methias Warren.37 By 1969, the Supreme Court was under the 
leadership of Warren Burger and was charged with the task of deciding how to apply the Katz 
doctrine.  
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in United States v. White that recordings of 
conversations obtained by undercover informants through the use of electronic listening devices 
were admissible in a criminal trial.38 Much of the rationale for this holding was based on the idea 
that an agent could already constitutionally transcribe,39 record,40 or electronically transmit41 a 
conversation without violating a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. The majority reasoned that 
“if the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police 
agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the 
conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the state’s case.”42 Some saw the 
ruling in White as a degradation of the rights instilled by Katz. In an apocalyptic dissent, Justice 
Douglas’ warned that unsupervised electronic surveillance would lead to a police state, stating 
                                                 
37 Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren’s Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement Affected His Work 
as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L 11, n. 6 (2005). 
38 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
39 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300-303 (1966). 
40 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
41 See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
 
42
 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 
(1963)). 
11 
that “what the ancients knew as ‘eavesdropping,’ we now call ‘electronic surveillance’; but to 
equate the two is to treat man’s first gunpowder on the same level as the nuclear bomb.”43  
In Smith v. Maryland the Supreme Court sought to determine whether the government 
could constitutionally utilize data obtained from a “pen register” in monitoring a suspect’s home 
phone activity.44 A “pen register” is a mechanical device installed at the central telephone facility 
that is used to record numbers dialed on a telephone.45 Applying Katz, the Supreme Court held 
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”46 Likening call activity to bank deposit records, the majority found that the suspect 
“assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed”47 and 
therefore use of such call logs by the government did not amount to a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
Following Smith there was once again public outcry regarding the degradation of Katz,48 
so much so that Congress passed legislation in 1986 limiting the use of such devices in law 
enforcement.49 Some state courts even outright rejected the holding in Smith. For example, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court found a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone records under 
the state constitution.50 While the content of one’s private conversations remained protected 
under Katz, it was now possible for the government to constitutionally obtain transactional data 
about a suspect’s telephone activity. 
                                                 
43 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting).  
44 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
45 Id. at 736, fn. 1. 
46 Id. at 743. 
47 Id. 
48 See Lawrence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1391 (2d ed. 1988). 
49 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3126 (2005). 
50 See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982). 
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B. Electronic Surveillance: Searching Beyond the Naked Eye 
Between 1967 and 1971, a “national surveillance state”51 had begun to emerge through 
the development of the “regulatory search doctrine.” A regulatory search is “governed by the 
Fourth Amendment but does not require probable cause as defined traditionally by the Supreme 
Courts.”52 In 1967, the Supreme Court held in Camara that a warrant procedure is required under 
the Fourth Amendment for administrative entry and inspection of private commercial premises.53 
Yet by 1971, the Supreme Court had decided that caseworker home visits were not violations of 
Fourth Amendment rights, as welfare benefits were not required by law.54 The Supreme Court 
took a similar stance when it came to whether or not telephone carriers were obligated to aid the 
government in conducting criminal investigations.55 In New York Telephone, the Supreme Court 
held that federal courts had authority over telecommunications providers to “compel, upon 
request, any assistance necessary to accomplish an electronic interception.”56  
In 1972, the Supreme Court handed down the “Keith” case, holding that the Fourth 
Amendment required judicial approval before the government could conduct electronic 
surveillance for domestic criminal investigations.57 The majority proclaimed that the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment “is not dead language”58 nor “an inconvenience to be somehow 
‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency,” rather it is “an important working part of our 
machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but 
                                                 
51 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 
(2008). 
52 United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1061 (1993). 
53 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
54 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
55 See United States v. New York Telephone, 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
56 Id. at 176-177. 
57 United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
58 Id. at 315. 
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mistakenly overzealous executive officers’ who are a part of any system of law enforcement.”59 
The Supreme Court seemed very much at ease with the government’s use of electronic 
surveillance-- so long as the judiciary was able to act as a check on executive power. 
For nearly two decades, courts have looked approvingly upon video surveillance in 
domestic criminal investigations.60 In Taketa, the Ninth Circuit wrote that “videotaping of 
suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment; the police 
may record what they normally may view with the naked eye.”61 However, courts have reasoned 
that “even if one cannot expect total privacy while alone . . . [a] diminished privacy interest does 
not eliminate society’s expectation to be protected from the severe intrusion of having the 
government monitor private activities through hidden video cameras.”62 In Trujillo, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police locker room and 
therefore a video surveillance camera that “recorded [the officers] in various states of undress” 
violated the Fourth Amendment.63  
Today, video surveillance cameras operated by government agencies are so ubiquitous, 
that citizens often complain when they are not present or functional.64 However, the development 
of new surveillance technologies has created cameras that can see well beyond what a human 
“may view with the naked eye.”65 It is well established that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in “open fields,” even when one attempts to keep them shielded from public view.66 In 
Dow Chemical, the Supreme Court held that “the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial 
                                                 
59 Id. at 315-316 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)). 
60 United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. Cal. 1991). 
61 United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. Nev. 1991). 
62 United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 604 (9th Cir. Wash. 2000). 
63 Trujillo v. City of Ontario, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
64 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/nyregion/30subway.html. 
65 United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. Nev. 1991). 
66 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
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plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”67 
The opinion states that “the mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the 
degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”68 Much of the majority’s reasoning is 
based on the fact that the camera used was a standard aerial photography camera that was 
generally available to the public. The majority conceded that “surveillance of private property by 
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as 
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”69 
In Dow Chemical, Justice Burger prophetically imagined “an electronic device to 
penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical 
formulae or other trade secrets” and warned that such a device “would raise very different and 
far more serious questions.”70 By 2001, police had begun to use thermal imaging cameras to 
detect infrared radiation given off by the presence of special high-intensity lamps used for the 
growth of marijuana in suspect’s homes. In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that use of such a 
device “to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion” amounted to a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.71 The majority rested their opinion upon the fact that the 
government was using a device that was not in general public use. Taken in combination, Dow 
Chemical and Kyllo can be read together to suggest “government use of new technologies should 
always be subject to the warrant requirement unless they are in general public use.”72  
                                                 
67 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 237. 
70 Id. at 239. 
71 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
72 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of 
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (2002). 
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The Supreme Court has expressed concern about surveillance techniques that invade 
citizen’s lawful activities, such as thermal imaging cameras,73 but seems less concerned with 
techniques that reveal only unlawful activities.74 For example, the Supreme Court held in Place 
that “a ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog” was sui generis in the fact that “it 
does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view.”75 
In 1998, the FBI began using “packet sniffer” technology called “Carnivore” that was able to 
search internet traffic for certain keywords pertaining to investigations.76 The system was “in 
principle capable of searching through that data in order to find particular names, or key phrases 
such as ‘nuclear bomb.’”77 There was much public outcry over the use of Carnivore and the 
privacy concerns it raised were “eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s book ‘1984.’”78 Despite 
the fact that the system -- in theory -- only revealed unlawful activities, it was abandoned in early 
2005 in favor of commercially available software programs.79  
However, the FBI has subsequently developed “Magic Lantern” software that can record 
a computer user’s keystrokes remotely. Previously the Supreme Court ruled that in order to 
install a “keystroke capture” device on a suspect’s computer, agents had to show probable cause 
that a suspect was involved in a crime and that there was evidence of criminal activity contained 
on a specific computer.80 However, Magic Lantern does not require physical access to a 
suspect’s computer and can be installed remotely without ones consent, much like a computer 
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virus.81 For example, a suspect could unknowingly install the software by clicking on a “Click 
here to win!” pop-up ad.82 This technical difference means that the government can install a 
keystroke logger on a suspect’s computer without physically trespassing into their home,83 
creating a legal distinction within the context of the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit has 
recently ruled that the government’s use of a key-logging surveillance device is “constitutionally 
indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the Supreme Court approved in [Maryland 
v.] Smith.”84 
C. The Personal Computer: The Search and Seizure of Data 
In 1967, the Supreme Court held in Warren v. Hayden that a search warrant could be 
issued to seize evidence of a crime.85 Ever since the advent of the personal computing, digital 
storage of data has allowed authorities to reconstruct facts surrounding any number of alleged 
crimes through evidence obtained through computer forensics. While courts have recognized 
evidence obtained through governmental searches and seizures of computer data,86 strict 
standards have emerged as to the validity of search warrants related to such information.87 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the particularity requirement of the 
Warrant Clause, stating “by limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things 
for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be 
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging 
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exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.”88 The Supreme Court has rejected 
blanket warrants as being too broad, finding “the requirement that the warrant itself particularly 
describe the material to be seized is not only to circumscribe the discretion of the executing 
officers but also to inform the person subject to the search and seizure what the officers are 
entitled to take.”89  
However, in the context of computer search warrants, the Ninth Circuit has allowed 
generic warrants “when a more precise description is not possible.”90 It is often the case that 
investigators will not know what exact data they are searching for, merely the fact that evidence 
of a crime may be stored digitally on a suspect’s computer. The Ninth Circuit has also allowed 
the search of a suspected child pornographer’s computer without specifying any “specific acts, 
time frames or persons” involved.91 Once computer equipment is seized, it is implied that 
“extraction of unlawful images from within the computer and diskettes was therefore 
contemplated by the warrant.”92 Following the Ninth Circuit’s precedent, the First Circuit has 
also upheld a warrant that allowed for the “seizure of computer equipment,” without any further 
particularity.93  
Police often prefer vague search warrants, so as not to hamper the admissibility of 
incriminating evidence found on a computer once it has been searched. For example, in Carey 
the Tenth Circuit held that when searching a suspect’s computer under a warrant for information 
about illegal drugs, images discovered containing child pornography were not within the scope 
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of the warrant and were therefore inadmissible.94 Carey states that when dealing with 
“intermingled documents,” law enforcement “must engage in the intermediate step of sorting 
various types of documents and then only search the ones specified in a warrant.”95 However, the 
Ninth Circuit has allowed the searching of intermingled computer files where the difficulty of 
sorting the data on-site is specifically outlined in an affidavit.96 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit 
has found that when a police warrant specifies a specific number of illegal images, and more are 
found on a suspect’s computer, the additional images may be admissible.97 In Campos, the court 
allowed an additional six images of child pornography to be admitted at trial even though the 
search warrant was based off of two specific images that had been transmitted from the suspects 
computer.98  
Absent a search warrant, there are still methods for government officials to search 
suspect’s computers under exceptions to the Warrant Clause. The well-established “plain view 
doctrine” allows police to search a suspect’s property without a warrant when there is probable 
cause based on an officer’s visual observations.99 This principle is often invoked by U.S. 
Customs, which has the authority to examine a laptop when a citizen enters the county from a 
foreign nation.100 Some state courts have held that viewable images on a suspect’s computer fall 
under the “plain view” exception. In Schroeder, a Wisconsin Appellate Court held that the 
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doctrine was applicable to an officer seeing images of child pornography displayed on the 
monitor of a suspect’s computer.101  
The “consent doctrine”102 also applies in the context of computer searches under the 
Fourth Amendment.103 The Eight Circuit has even allowed a co-tenant to consent to the search of 
one’s computer without a warrant.104 However, possessors of illegal content often take the time 
to password protect their computers in order to limit access to incriminating files. The Fourth 
Circuit has held that password protecting a user’s files on a shared computer serves as an 
affirmative intention to exclude others from access and therefore other users could not consent to 
access.105 Courts have grappled with the issue of passwords in depth, concluding “because 
intimate information is commonly stored on computers, it seems natural that computers should 
fall into the same category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal items that command a high 
degree of privacy.”106  
In addition to passwords, users will often seek to encrypt files using software that only 
allows access to those with the proper cipher key. One legal scholar has concluded, “while 
encrypting a file cannot itself trigger Fourth Amendment protection, it does not eliminate the 
Fourth Amendment protections that otherwise govern law enforcement access to the file.”107 
In 2007, the Tenth Circuit outlined a broad framework for determining whether or not a 
computer was locked using the “totality of the circumstances” approach108 to search and seizure 
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consent.109 State Courts have also recently begun to establish local standards for computer 
searches.110  
The issue of shared computers often arises in the context of the workplace, where users 
are often given specific logins in order to access, store and share files. In the past decade, a 
majority of jurisdictions have held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in files 
downloaded to a workplace computer.111 For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace computers and thus there is no standing to invoke 
Fourth Amendment protection.112 The Ziegler Court reasoned, “social norms suggest that 
employees are not entitled to privacy in the use of workplace computers, which belong to their 
employers and pose significant dangers in terms of diminished productivity and even employer 
liability.”113 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Barrows has ruled that where a government 
employee brings a personal computer to work and connects to the network there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.114 The Barrows opinion states that “those who bring personal material 
into public spaces, making no effort to shield that material from public view, cannot reasonably 
expect their personal materials to remain private.”115 However, the Ninth Circuit has recently 
retreated from its earlier position in Ziegler, holding in an en banc rehearing that “even where a 
private employee retains an expectation that his private office will not be the subject of an 
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unreasonable government search, such interest may be subject to the possibility of an employer’s 
consent to a search of the premises which it owns.” 116 
D. The Internet: Personal Data Goes Viral 
A century before the first e-mail was ever sent117 the Supreme Court created the guiding 
principle that today applies to government seizures of messages while in transit.118 In 1878, Ex 
Parte Jackson held that mailed documents are private under the Fourth Amendment and 
therefore the government must obtain a warrant prior to seizing mailed items.119 However, unlike 
traditional mail, electronic messages are often retained on third-party servers long after being 
“delivered.” This difference creates legal issues for when the government can access potentially 
incriminating messages depending on what stage a message is being sought during an 
investigation. 
Early in the days of the internet it was established that there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for e-mail served on a “centralized and privately-owned computer bank.” 120 In Maxwell, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that an AOL user’s e-mails were protected 
from warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment.121 Even with a proper warrant, 
government agents have “the constitutional obligation of avoiding, to the greatest possible 
extent, seizure of conversations which have no relationship to the crimes being investigated or 
the purpose for which electronic surveillance has been authorized.”122 Some Courts have even 
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found that there is such a strong expectation of privacy in workplace e-mails that private 
interceptions of e-mail can give rise to common law claims of intrusion of privacy.123 
There is also a longstanding legal distinction between the content of a message versus the 
information found on the outside of the envelope. Any investigator that is legally allowed to 
search e-mail header information can learn a lot about a suspect without ever infringing upon the 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights in the content of the message.124 Legal scholar Orin Kerr 
points out that “each of the lines in the mail header has specific meaning, and when read 
together, tells a story about the message, how it was processed, and how and when the network 
directed it from its origin to its destination.”125 So while the contents of an e-mail may be 
protected, the “who, what, where, when and how” may be revealed without a search warrant. 
Courts have also found that the more transient a message is, the less the content of the 
message will be protected. Instant messages, text messages and chat room discussions have been 
analyzed differently than traditional e-mails and are more comparable to short messages found 
on the back of a post card. Therefore, at least some jurisdictions have held that individuals do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy for statements made in an internet chat room.126 Much 
of the reasoning in such cases is that when third-parties are given access to information, there is a 
lessened expectation that the communication will be kept private. The Eleventh Circuit has just 
recently applied this same principle to e-mails, holding that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an e-mail once a copy has been delivered to a third-party.127 However, the Ninth 
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Circuit has found a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages because in the Court’s 
opinion there is “no meaningful distinction between text messages and letters.”128 
There is a strong governmental interest in intercepting certain e-mails when it comes to 
criminal investigations, but there has been sizable amounts of litigation on what is meant by the 
term “intercept.”129 In 1986, congressed enacted Title II of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”)130 as a method of extending restrictions on telephone wiretaps to include 
electronic messages send via computer. The ECPA created three classes for electronic messages: 
(1) real time, (2) transient and (3) long term (more than 180 days). Therefore the Courts were 
able to carve out differing expectations of privacy depending on how a message was classified.  
The Ninth Circuit has noted that the “ECPA was deliberately structured to afford 
electronic communications in storage less protection than other forms of communication.”131 It is 
a violation of the ECPA to intercept a “real time” message while it is in transit.132 Similarly, an 
e-mail in temporary storage en route to it’s final destination may not be intercepted under the 
ECPA.133 There is also a narrow definition of what constitutes an “electronic communication,” 
and the at least one Court has held that information stored in an airline’s online reservation 
system was not subject to the ECPA.134 
The tiered structure of classifying e-mails based on their state is useful to courts, but 
makes it very difficult for a government agent to answer the simple question “do the police need 
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a warrant to obtain e-mail?”135 The way e-mail actually works it is not anything like a traditional 
letter send through the mail, of which there is presumably just a single copy. A typical e-mail 
from person A to person B is stored in at least four places: (1) the sender’s computer, (2) the 
sender’s e-mail host, (3) the recipient’s e-mail host and (4) the recipients computer.136 So unlike 
a traditional letter, there are at least three additional copies of every message sent which are 
outside of the sender’s constructive possession. Each copy may reside in a different jurisdiction 
and potentially be subject to varying laws based upon locality. This distinction makes the laws 
regulating e-mail hosts and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) critical in determining what 
information the government may access without a search warrant. 
 A decade before there were any ISP’s, the Supreme Court held that the government could 
seize evidence from third-party news organizations without violating Fourth Amendment 
rights.137 Congress quickly responded to the Supreme Court’s decision by passing the Privacy 
Protection Act (“PPA”) in 1980, which limited the ability of law enforcement to use warrants in 
searching or seizing certain materials possessed for the purpose of public dissemination.138 
However, as one Federal judge has pointed out, “cyberspace is a nonphysical ‘place’ and its very 
structure, a computer and telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”139 
The government may require that an ISP provide stored communications and 
transactional records under two circumstances, if: “(1) it obtains a warrant [], or (2) it gives prior 
notice to the online subscriber and then issues a subpoena or receives a court order authorizing 
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disclosure of the information in question.”140 Absent either of these two circumstances, the user 
must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data being sought under a traditional Katz 
analysis. To have an interest in privacy, there must be some exclusion of others to the data.141 
According to the Hambrick court, this is possible when two conditions have been met: “(1) the 
data must not be knowingly exposed to others, and (2) the Internet service provider’s ability to 
access the data must not constitute a disclosure.”142 Disclosure of certain information, such as a 
user’s public profile information, does not constitute a violation of one’s Fourth Amendment’s 
rights. In McVeigh, a soldier’s AOL profile revealed that his sexual preferences violated the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, but as the profile was publically available it was not 
protected under the Fourth Amendment.143 
Nevertheless, there are certain instances where an ISP warrant is not required.144 In Guest 
v. Leis, the Sixth Circuit found that a sender “would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
an e-mail that had already reached its recipient; at this moment, the e-mailer would be analogous 
to a letter-writer, whose ‘expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery’ of the 
letter.”145 Some state courts have taken different approaches as well, such as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court who held that a subscriber has a privacy interest in his ISP information under 
New Jersey’s state constitution.146 
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E. The Mobile Phone: Wirelessness Leads to Lawlessness 
On October 17, 1973, a Motorola researcher filed a patent for a “radio telephone system,” 
giving birth to the first hand-held mobile phone.147 From that point forward, telephone 
conversations ceased being tied to a physical infrastructure of wires and conversations became 
“wireless.” What was once a technology limited to the privacy of ones home became available in 
public spaces. Just five years earlier the Supreme Court had created the “plain view doctrine,” 
which holds that there is no reasonable expectation in privacy if it possible for something to be 
heard or seen from a public vantage point.148 Taking the telephone outside of the literal language 
of the Fourth Amendment meant courts had to re-evaluate how the law should apply to mobile 
devices. 
One of the major issues pertaining to mobile phones is that phone companies are able to 
determine where a user is located using triangulation of a user’s wireless signal.149 This 
technology provides mobile users with location-based services (“LBS”), including such popular 
uses as vehicle navigation,150 locating nearby businesses151 and even monitoring the location of 
children.152 Critics of LBS warn that since cell phone users are almost nearly near their phones, 
the technology is essentially amounts to human tracking.153 In 2003, two GPS researchers went 
as far as to warn that “society must contemplate a new form of slavery, characterized by location 
control.”154 
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While there has been little legislation on the issue of LBS in mobile devices, there is 
well-established case law on the government’s use of GPS to track suspects. In Karo, the 
Supreme Court held that “the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open 
to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable 
interest in the privacy of the residence.”155 The majority found it to be “obvious” that “private 
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental 
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared 
to recognize as justifiable.”156 
While private residences are clearly protected, the Fourth Amendment is more narrowly 
construed in the context of automobiles. In Knotts, the Supreme Court found that “a person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his movements from one place to another,” and therefore the government could track a vehicle 
without a warrant so long as it was on a public highway.157 This holding was based upon the 
earlier Cardwell decision, which reasoned that “one has a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as 
the repository of personal effects.”158 
Both Karo and Knotts are often interpreted in the context of GPS, yet they were actually 
decided more than decade before the technology was available for civilian use.159 Those cases 
involved older beeper technology, which involved wireless signal triangulation instead of 
satellite tracking as is found in many modern app phones. While the Supreme Court has yet to 
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rule on GPS specifically, at least one state has ruled that police need a warrant in order to attach 
a GPS responder to a car. 160 However, the Jackson case was decided under the Washington State 
Constitution161 and did not fully address the subjective expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.162 
 At least one District Court has found that the government is allowed access to cell phone 
location information under the same consent reasoning discussed above in Smith v. Maryland.163 
Judge Gorenstein of the Southern District of New York concluded that “Congress expected 
physical location information -- including cell site information -- would be obtainable by the 
Government by using some mechanism in combination with the Pen Register Statute.”164 There 
have been at least three other District Court cases on government access to cell site data,165 none 
of which flatly prohibited government access to such data under the Fourth Amendment. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Warren and Brandeis wrote of their article, “it is our purpose to consider whether the 
existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the 
individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such protection is.” This paper has the 
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same goal, merely time shifted to the present era of the “mobile internet tsunami”166 in which we 
currently live. This discussion will seek to identify changes between the time Katz was decided 
and now, specifically related to expectations, technologies and ideologies. 
A. Changing Expectations 
“There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment… It was even 
conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug into your wire whenever they 
wanted to. You had to live – did live, from habit that became instinct – in the assumption that every sound you made 
was overheard, and except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.” 167 
- George Orwell, “1984” 
The Katz test has created a sliding scale approach to interpretation of the law such that as 
society’s expectations change, therefore the law should as well. The issue is complicated by the 
fact that the test relies upon both the individual’s subjective expectations as well as objectively 
what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Without completely dismissing the first 
prong of Katz, it is safe to assume that when it comes to the admissibility of incriminating 
evidence obtained during a government investigation, most defendant’s would argue post facto 
that they individually expected the evidence to remain private. Therefore, the crux of the issue 
for the purposes of this analysis is identifying the objective expectations of society with regard to 
the privacy of one’s personal information. 
In 1987, the Supreme Court laid down a number of factors to consider in measuring the 
expectations of society: “although there is no ‘talisman’ that determines whether society will find 
a person’s expectation of privacy reasonable, a court may consider (1) the nature of the search, 
(2) where the search takes place, (3) the person’s use of the place, (4) our societal understanding 
that certain places deserve more protections than others, and (5) the severity of the search.”168 
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While the Ortega factors are still good law, the factors are greatly complicated by the scope and 
complexity of the internet. Government searches can now take place across borders, without the 
suspect’s knowledge and even on anonymous or seemingly random suspects. 
While courts have generally seemed to permit searches conducted on specific persons 
with narrowly worded warrants, the issue of warrantless “road stop” stings still persists. The 
problem is not so much the lack of clear statutory directives on the issue, but more the issue of a 
government agent in the field not knowing whether their actions are constitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment. To give examples of this phenomenon, three hypothetical situations will be 
identified and discussed.  
First, there is the inadvertent possessor of child pornography. Unfortunately, much of the 
case law on internet searches and seizures involves child pornography or the exploitation of 
children. The millennial generation has dove head-first into social networking and in some social 
circles it is considered “normal” for people to meet over the internet prior to meeting in person. It 
would not be hard to imagine A meeting B online on Match.com and due to B lying about their 
age they actually a 16-year-old minor. After sending flirty text messages back and forth, B sends 
A a naked picture, which A views on their iPhone (known colloquially as “sexting,”169 a 
portmanteau of “sex” and “texting.”) This problem could escalate into a crime even if A was 
completely under the belief that B was of age.  
Under the Ortega factors it is unclear what society’s expectation would be as to A’s right 
to privacy. Assuming the government became aware of A’s possession of the illegal images from 
B’s parents, the government would have a difficult time determining the best way to prosecute A 
for possession of child pornography. They would likely have tracer information from the e-mail, 
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but this might only reveal an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address and server information, not A’s 
actual identity. However, if the government wanted to access data stored on A’s iPhone 
(specifically within the Match.com app), society could easily consider such information private. 
The expectation of privacy would probably be less for the information made already public on 
A’s Match.com profile, so the government could likely use that information to track down A. It 
is also likely that since text messages are tied to individual user’s telephone numbers, the 
government could subpoena the cell phone provider to hand over A’s contact and usage 
information. There might also be implications for Match.com under the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).170 
This hypothetical seems bizarre, but is apparently a common problem and some teenagers 
have even faced child pornography charges under similar circumstances. Last year, a number of 
young couples at Greensberg Salem High School in Greensburg, PA were caught “sexting” when 
a principal confiscated one of the student’s cell phones.171 The students, ranging in ages from 14 
to 17, were charged with manufacturing, disseminating and possessing child pornography172 and 
could face up to 10 years in prison and have to register as sex offenders for their actions. While 
society expects the government to protect children and be strict with sexual predators, it seems 
that the law has not taken in to account the development of technology and the changes in 
societal expectations. 
Second, there is the “Jack Bauer”173 scenario of the suspected terrorist with an app 
phone. In this hypothetical situation, the government has intelligence reports, which indicate that 
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the terrorist is about to attack and they have been using their iPhone to plan the attack. Access to 
the terrorist’s iPhone data could reveal the terrorist’s current location, their communications with 
other terror cell members and surveillance done of the target. Let’s also assume that the 
government has the resources to access the data remotely from both AT&T’s servers and 
Google’s user information. 
There are very few American’s who would object to the government using all of its 
resources available to find the terrorist in order to prevent the attack. However, most citizens 
would take issue with the government monitoring their own iPhone activity as it relates to 
location, messages and searches. This NIMBY174 dichotomy means that there is great public 
outcry over systems like CARNIVORE, but at the same time the public has a valid expectation 
that the government will monitor terrorist activity if they have the ability to do so. 
In a post-9/11 world, Americans have seemed to be willing to give up certain rights of 
privacy for the greater safety of American interests that terrorists have sought to attack. 
Introduced on October 23, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act is a controversial piece of legislation 
that permits the government certain privileges in searching telephone, e-mail, medical, financial 
and other records.175 Most significantly, the “sneak and peak” section “allows agents executing 
search warrants to delay telling the targets that their property has been searched or even 
seized.”176 Without going into a discussion of the validity of anti-terrorism tools, the Act has 
undoubtedly created new methods for the government to circumvent citizen’s Fourth 
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Amendment protections. Even though “9/11 changed everything,” it is still unclear a decade later 
what the long-term implications will be on societal expectations of privacy. 
Third, let’s assume there is a Ponzi schemer who’s guilt can be proven by evidence stored 
on their app phone. In this “Bernie Madoff”177 scenario, federal prosecutors have unveiled a 
widespread financial fraud scheme and need access to the data stored on the ring-leader’s 
iPhone, such as their calendar, e-mails, and internal memos amongst other data. Let’s further 
assume that the app phone is in the government’s possession but it is encrypted so they cannot 
access the data without using decryption tools, which would be illegal if used by a member of the 
general public. 
Again, in this situation it is not unthinkable to believe that such a wealth of information 
could be stored on a single iPhone. In the real-life Madoff case it was widely reported that he 
used a single, antiquated IBM AS/400 computer from the 1980’s to produce false records with 
the help of manipulated financial software.178 Computer models like the one he used were rated 
as high as 66 MHz,179 or roughly 11% of the processing power of the latest iPhone -- so it is not 
hard to imagine such a scheme being conducted entirely on a modern app phone. 
Society not only expects the government to keep track of such financial activities, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is charged with monitoring such investors.180 In 1999, 
Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act181 (“GLBA”), which had major privacy 
requirements for financial institutions in the “collection, disclosure and protection of consumers’ 
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nonpublic personal information.”182 Again, there becomes the question of protecting the public 
versus respecting the privacy of individual citizens. Society would likely expect the government 
to search for “red flags,”183 yet at the same time abstain from monitoring individual account 
activity without probable cause and a search warrant. 
These previous three hypothetical’s are a combination of recent headlines with notable 
legislative actions during the past decade. They are meant to illustrate that there are serious 
conflicts between what society expects of their government-- not only in terms of protection but 
also individual privacy. These current issues have not only been appropriate bellwethers for 
measuring the current expectations of society, they also might represent degradations in what 
society expects to be private because of technological advances. 
B. Changing Technology 
“Doing a privacy change for 350 million users is not the kind of thing that a lot of companies would do. But we 
viewed that as a really important thing, to always keep a beginner’s mind and what would we do if we were starting 
the company now and we decided that these would be the social norms now and we just went for it.”184 
- Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook CEO 
Many of the Supreme Court cases discussed above warn that while their holdings may be 
applicable to the current technologies, the law will have to adapt as new developments are made. 
There is none more prophetic than the Dow Chemical case,185 which involved the EPA taking 
aerial photographs of a chemical plant. The majority felt that because the aerial photographs 
were taken using a widely available consumer technology, that Fourth Amendment rights had not 
been violated. As quoted above, the majority wrote that “surveillance of private property by 
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as 
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satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”186 In 2010, such 
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment is generally available to the public, specifically any 
iPhone user via the Google Maps™ app.187 Users can enter nearly any address in the United 
States and get a satellite image of that location that is accurate enough to make out buildings, 
cars and even pedestrians. 
In Justice Burger’s own words, such a technology “might be constitutionally proscribed 
absent a warrant” simply because it is beyond what the human eye could observe without 
magnification. Justice Burger even notes that the Government’s own attorney’s conceded that 
satellite images might raise constitutional problems. While Google Maps is not so detailed as to 
reveal “identifiable human faces or secret documents” as feared in Dow Chemical, it could easily 
reveal a marijuana farm188 or even an illegally dumped boat.189 Recently, a Florida police officer 
used Google Earth™ to track down the owner of a boat that had been dumped into an 
undeveloped subdivision near Pensacola.190 
Satellite imagery is clearly a technology that until recently was not available to the 
average consumer. Today, it is essentially available for free to anyone that is connected to the 
internet. In theory, this could mean that since society expects public access to such information it 
is not unreasonable for the government to use such tools to prosecute suspects without a warrant. 
However, the Supreme Court has yet to decide any cases related to web-based satellite maps. 
There is also a more recent Google technology called “Street View™” that allows users 
to view 360° images of millions of locations throughout the United States. Available on the 
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iPhone, “people can virtually explore and navigate neighbourhoods through panoramic street-
level images.”191 Because these images are all taken on public streets using standard cameras, 
some advocates might argue that the government’s use of the service to prosecute criminals 
would be constitutional under the “Plain View Doctrine.” According to Google, the Street View 
function “contains imagery that is no different from what you might see driving or walking down 
the street.”192 Yet just as a pedestrian might witness a crime, so do Google’s camera’s in 
capturing the panoramas. One website193 has already documented twenty different types of 
crimes194 that have been caught on film by Google’s Street View cameras. 
While citizens have become increasingly comfortable with public surveillance cameras, 
Google’s cameras are more akin to undercover agents than typical traffic cameras. There is at 
least one case where individuals sued Google over images captured by their Street View 
cameras.195 A federal judge recently dismissed the suit against Google filed by a Pittsburgh 
couple who had sued under the legal theories of invasion of privacy, negligence, unjust 
enrichment and trespass.196 While the case did not involve a governmental search under the 
Fourth Amendment, it does raise almost the same exact issues first raised by Warren and 
Brandeis in their article 120 years earlier. 
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C. Changing Ideologies 
“If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.” 197 
- Eric Schmidt, Google CEO 
 
Society’s fears of governmental intrusion are not nearly as strong today as they have been 
in other times in American history. The greatest threat of the 21st century appears to be not that 
of government intrusion, but rather the power vested in corporations who control user’s data. 
Google owns three of the top ten visited websites in the United States,198 which combined 
account for over 9% of the page views world-wide over the past three months.199 This 
unbelievable market share has led many to fear Google due to the amount of information the 
company possesses200 about each of its 776 million users.201 Google is not shy about the fact that 
it uses data it gathers about its users to create profiles that are used for highly profitable 
behavioral advertising.202 
While the government obviously has nearly limitless intelligence resources for gathering 
data about citizens, it is more likely that individuals will voluntarily provide personal 
information to corporations who then become the gatekeepers of such privileged information. 
While there are certainly regulations on privacy and consequences for security breaches, 
Corporate America has been largely left to police itself with privacy policies,203 compliance 
programs204 and multi-national “safe harbor” treaties.205 While the government has an obligation 
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to regulate privacy, there has generally been a laissez faire attitude with regard to enforcement. 
Absent a few noteworthy exceptions, the government has brought only a limited number of 
enforcement actions206 against corporations for failure to uphold their own privacy policies. 
As it is increasingly corporations who control information, not the government, it might 
be said that they have the greatest influence on societal expectations of privacy. The concern 
then becomes what happens when the government begins to cooperate with corporations to yield 
data for searches of citizens. While Google is not a traditional ISP under the ECPA, it could be 
assumed that they would show some willingness to cooperate with subpoenas and warrant 
requests without the knowledge of their users.  
Recall that in New York Telephone, the Supreme Court held that federal courts had 
authority over telecommunications providers to “compel, upon request, any assistance necessary 
to accomplish an electronic interception.” This might lead some to conclude that the government 
could also compel assistance from technology providers such as Google. Notably, Google has 
recently teamed up with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) to help “block a government 
attempt to access the contents of a Yahoo! e-mail account without a search warrant based on 
probable cause.”207  
In an amicus brief on the issue, Google states that “as an electronic communications 
service to the public, Google receives legal process from various state and federal agencies, 
seeking customer information, including content of Gmail.”208 Google’s stance has been to 
provide assistance when a search warrant is provided, but now appears to contest requests that 
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are made without a proper search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. The brief specifically 
argues that “the mere fact that a service provider has the ability to access e-mail messages does 
not defeat the user’s expectation of privacy in their contents.”209 
The ideological change that Google’s stance represents is that the balance of power has 
shifted from that of the government being the sole possessor of the latest military surveillance 
technologies to corporations being the leader in the collection of personal information which the 
government would like to access. The next logical step is that the struggle will wind up in the 
Supreme Court and if Congress objects to the ruling they will respond with appropriate 
legislation that more accurately reflects societal expectations of privacy (as was the case with the 
infamous “pen register”).  
Some scholars have argued that this is the appropriate way for our government to handle 
such issues, as Congress is better suited for creating laws that reflect changing technologies than 
the judiciary. Orin Kerr believes that “courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of 
judicial caution when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide 
the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies . . . 
[w]hen technology is in flux, the Fourth Amendment protections should remain relatively modest 
until the technology stabilizes.”210 
There is also the issue of generational ideologies and how to define societal expectations 
of privacy. The average age of justices of the United States Supreme Court is roughly 68 years 
old,211 while the median age of an American citizen is only 36 years old.212 Famously, recently 
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retired Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Grokster,213 a case involving peer-to-peer file 
sharing networks, yet did not know how to operate a computer and wrote all of his opinions 
longhand using a fountain pen.214 Even Chief Justice John Roberts -- one of the youngest current 
members of the Supreme Court -- recently asked during oral arguments the difference was 
“between email and a pager.”215 Not questioning the brilliance of the Justices or their ability to 
grasp complex technical issues, it raises some questions about how society is able to define it’s 
own expectations of privacy. 
More generally there are generational gaps involving the expectation of privacy, 
especially as it relates to technology. Since the Congress and Federal Judiciary is generally 
comprised of an older generation, it may not be that the laws accurately reflect the emergences of 
new technologies. Typically, new technologies are usually adopted by younger generations prior 
to more widespread adoption. For example, there are over 50 million iPhone users and more than 
half of them are under the age of 30.216 This “mobile generation” has differing expectations of 
what should be kept private from government searches, however the law does not yet reflect 
these expectations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While Katz has served as a wonderful guidepost for the Supreme Court to weigh the law 
against technological advances over the past four decades, it has come time for a realignment of 
privacy principles that reflect advancements in technology proactively instead of reactively. 
America entered the “internet age” nearly a decade ago and wireless mobile computing has 
                                                                                                                                                             
212 http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts. 
213 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
214 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103694193. 
215 http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/19/our-tech-savvy-supreme-court. 
216 http://rubiconconsulting.com/downloads/whitepapers/Rubicon-iPhone_User_Survey.pdf. 
41 
become a ubiquitous part of our cultural fabric. Congress must work to establish new guidelines 
for creating self-limitations on the power of the government to conduct law enforcement 
investigations using the tools that are widely available to consumers on the internet or via app 
phones.  
While the text of the Bill of Rights remains unchanged, societal expectations of what 
should be kept private from government searches have morphed dramatically over the past few 
years. While it is true that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”217 there are 
fewer and fewer places that people consider private in light of mobile computing. The 
government should recognize this anomaly and create increased zones of privacy for users of 
wireless mobile devices as they become more commonplace amongst society.  
It is fitting to end this discussion with the words of Warren and Brandeis, who similarly 
concluded: “the common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable, 
often, even to his own officers engaged in the execution of its command. Shall the courts thus 
close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient 
curiosity?”218 Hopefully, the Supreme Court will continue to recognize the Fourth Amendment’s 
core commitment to protection of citizens from unwarranted government searches and usher in a 
new era of digital democracy.  
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